Randstad Rail more complex then expected
On the evening of Wednesday 29 November 2006, two RandstadRail trams derailed shortly after each other at the Ternoot and Forepark stops in The Hague. Seventeen passengers were injured in the Forepark derailment. The Haaglanden local authority launched an investigation into the RandstadRail section in The Hague. A team from TPM was awarded the contract in a public tender and set to work under the supervision of Professor Ernst ten Heuvelhof and Associate Professor Joop Koppenjan. A report by Joop Koppenjan and Martijn Leijten, one of the six researchers.
How could an apparently uncomplicated project get so out of hand? “RandstadRail appeared straightforward, even though it was a new form of transport. Existing rolling stock would be used on the existing rails. The operator was experienced and the technology was bought ‘off the shelf’. So what could possibly go wrong?” asks Koppenjan. Leijten: “If things had gone just a little differently, everything would have been a success. The points at Forepark would not have been damaged, or the fault would have been discovered in good time. There would have been no incidents. If things had gone just a little differently, it would have been a fantastic project: a good public-transport system, delivered within budget and almost on schedule. Some people say that RandstadRail was dogged by misfortune, and in a sense they are right.”
Complex
But… RandstadRail is the first light-rail project in the Netherlands and no-one realized how complex it would be. No-one realized how complicated it would be to implement innovations in existing technical systems, or that existing systems could not simply be linked together without a problem. Or that politicians would put pressure on the engineers to keep to schedule. Added to that, there was not actually a legal framework in place for light rail. Koppenjan: “The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management developed the framework more or less in tandem with the project. All in all, the parties involved underestimated the complexity of the project. The most misleading aspect was that they thought they had all the necessary expertise. They didn’t know what they didn’t know.”
Koppenjan and Leijten argue that complexity gradually crept into the project. “Complexity is managed by ‘cutting up’ both the project organisation and the process into ‘fragments’ that are straightforward and easy to manage. But at some stage the fragments have to be ‘joined together’ again. And that is what went wrong with RandstadRail.” The TPM researchers found that many of the mistakes were made in the modification period. The ‘OTP period’ (modification, testing and trial run) took three months. Leijten: “A crucial factor was that, in the end, the trial run lasted only three days. It consisted of a rushhour service without passengers. Amazingly, it went quite well, despite the fact that there were a lot of disruptions in the period before and after. But there wasn’t any more time available for testing and a trial run. The commissioning party wanted to keep to the schedule and stay within budget. After all the problems with tram tunnel in The Hague, the Haaglanden local authority didn’t want to things to go wrong again.”
Conclusion
Koppenjan: “In our study we conclude that the programme of requirements was a general one, which meant that a lot of changes had to be made as the project progressed. Because the budget and deadlines were tight, the planning was not flexible enough to allow for changes to be implemented properly. We’ve seen other situations in which officials have problems managing large-scale projects because it’s so difficult to assess how complex they are. They are often afraid that they’ll be taken for a ride if they let go of the reins, and that the project will spiral out of control. Officials are usually held to account for that.”
Furthermore, relations between officials and managers were strained at RandstadRail. Koppenjan: “Managers indicated that something could not be done, but at the same time they wanted to cooperate with the officials. That put them in a difficult position. The official says: ‘I have to make the decision; I’m under pressure. Can it be done or not?’ But the technical reality is often much more complicated than the administrative reality, in which politicians just want to hear ‘yes’ or ‘no’.” The fact that officials have problems steering complex projects was also evident in projects such as the High-Speed Line South, the refurbishment of the Rijksmuseum, the construction of the Amsterdam North/South line, and from the problems with the tunnels in the A73. But lessons have been learned from the RandstadRail project, according to the TPM researchers. “In the Hoekse Lijn project it was decided to take the line out of service for an extended period during the upgrade to light rail. That is precisely what the officials had tried to avoid with RandstadRail.”
Recommendation
“Complex projects can’t be mapped out step-by-step in advance”, admit Koppenjan and Leijten. “But you can set out conditions for good adaptive management in advance. The basic message in our recommendation is: consider how, without suddenly letting go of the reins, you can create a framework that allows greater flexibility for responding to uncertainties and changes. Our solution is to create checks and balances in the management process. In addition to a councillor who is responsible for finance and progress, there should be another official - independent of the first - to monitor quality aspects. At the same time, parties must agree in advance on ground rules for dealing with any conflicts that arise - you don’t want the project to stagnate because of conflicts.”
The summary of the study on the RandstadRail section in The Hague can be found at www.haaglanden.nl.
